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A CONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF PROLOG 
DAMJAN BOJADZIEV 
D A constructive rationalization of PROLOG is presented, covering the logical 
form of definite clause programs and the role of negative (goal) clauses. This 
view is developed from the idea, taken from set theory, that a constructive 
theory can be obtained if classical reasoning is confined to a constructively 
limited basis. The syntax of definite clauses is seen as reflecting a construc- 
tive view of description in that it prevents the expression of incomplete and 
negative information; the purely negative clauses initiate a classical proof 
technique, operating on a definite axiomatic basis. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Logic programming by means of Horn clauses, as realized in PROLOG, can be 
interpreted from a constructive point of view. A connection with constructive logic’ 
is apparent at the level of syntax (in the linguistic sense of the word): a constructive 
orientation is built into the logic of definite clauses at the level of formation rules, 
whereas the logical apparatus which the PROLOG interpreter uses on the program 
clauses and the goals is quite classical. An analogous ituation is sketched in Qume’s 
remarks on Weyl’s set theory in [ll]: it is a constructive theory in which classical 
reasoning is retained, but applied to a constructively limited basis. This idea is 
transposed to the context of logic programming and used for a constructive 
rationalization of the limited expressive power of definite clause programs (absence 
Address correspondence to Damjan Bojadziev, Department of Computer Science and Informatics, 
Jamova. 39, 61111 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. 
t The expression ‘constructive logic’ is not used here in any precise sense; as Quine wrote in [ll], 
‘constructivism in mathematics is intolerance of methods that lead to affirming the existence of things of 
some sort without showing how to find one. This is not a sharp definition of constructivism; there is none, 
or no unique one. My vague word ‘find’ could mean ‘compute’, in the case of a number and ‘construct’ in 
some sense, in the case of a geometric figure or set.’ 
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of existential quantification, disjunction, and negation) and the classical mechanism 
of their execution. 
After the extensive formal reinterpretation of logic programming based on the 
intuitionistic theory of inductive definitions, given by Hagiya and Sakurai in [5], the 
contribution of this article is to indicate what could be said about the subject in an 
informal and rather elementary fashion by applying a different, more “conservative” 
idea. 
2. PROLOG AND CLAUSAL LOGIC 
The prevailing paradigm of mechanical theorem proving, in which the programming 
language PROLOG has been developed, is reductio ad absurdurn over the Skolem 
clausal form: the negation of the alleged theorem, transformed into clausal form, is 
adjoined to the clauses coming from the axioms, and from the resulting mass of 
clauses the resolution rule attempts to produce the empty clause of contradiction. At 
this general level, the only point of contact with constructive logic is the possible 
constructivity of proofs: a reductio ad absurdurn proof of a (positive) existential 
statement is not in general bound to produce concrete (ground) instances of the 
quantified variable, which makes it constructively unacceptable. Moreover, when 
performing a reduction over the clausal form, it may happen that even when 
concrete instances of variables are produced, it would be a bit strained to speak of 
the constructivity of the proof. “Constructed” instances may contain terms intro- 
duced by the operation of Skolemization, if existential quantifiers were eliminated in 
the passage to clausal form. The result of this operation is not (within first order 
logic) equivalent o the original, but is semantically justified by the axiom of choice 
[4]; according to Curry [2], this axiom is not acceptable, at least to the intuitionistic 
branch of constructivism. The constructivity of a mechanical proof procedure may 
thus be merely formal: insofar as instances of variables involve Skolem terms, these 
instances are actually “made up”, not properly constructed. The object whose 
existence is proved may be determined in a terminology which is not used in the 
original axiomatic description, but is instead introduced into it on a constructively 
dubious basis. 
The language of pure PROLOG as a syntactic restriction of the full clausal form 
is partly determined by the requirement hat the disjunctions of the clausal form 
contain at most one positive literal. The way in which the restriction to one positive 
literal limits the expressive power of the original language is more readily apparent 
from the implicative form of the clauses. Rewriting the clause scheme 
PI v . . . v Pn v 41 v . . . v -Qm 
as an implication and distinguishing the usual cases of 
(a) conditional statements or rules 
PI v . . . v Pn <- Ql & . . . & Qm 
(b) unconditional statements of facts 
PI v . . . v Pv <- 
(c) purely negative clauses or denials 
<- Ql & . . . & Qm 
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(d) the empty clause of contradiction 
<- 
it is seen that the restriction n =< 1 affects only conditional statements and facts 
and amounts to excluding disjunction from them. However, there is a further 
defining characteristic of the PROLOG sublanguage of clausal form, namely that 
denials function only as control statements to the theorem prover. At the general 
level of theorem proving in clausal logic this is true only of the empty clause, which 
serves as a HALT statement. In PROLOG, this is also true of denials, which serve as 
CALL statements: denials cannot be used in writing, but only in calling programs. 
3. DEFINITE CLAUSE PROGRAMS 
According to the above restrictions, a pure PROLOG program can consist of only 
two kinds of clauses, called de$nite clauses: restricted conditionals 
(a’) P <- Ql & . . . & Qm 
and simple facts 
(b’) P <- 
The reason for the qualifier ‘definite’ is fairly obvious: the conditionals determine 
definite consequences of the facts, in the sense that they allow no “uncertainty” of 
the kind which is conveyed by using disjunction or existential quantification in the 
conclusions. There is no such uncertainty in the facts either: they do not include 
disjunctive statements or statements of indeterminate, unnamed existence. This 
discrimination of incomplete information suggests that the logical form of definite 
clauses can be seen as embodying a constructive conception of description, insofar 
as constructivism can be characterized as a radically different stance toward what is 
classically regarded as merely incomplete information. The absence of disjunctive 
facts and conclusions would correspond to the constructive view, according to which 
a proof of a disjunctive epitheorem demands the provability of at least one disjunct. 
As Curry [2] has put it, ‘we do not admit the possibility that we can be sure of P or 
Q without knowing which’. A similar restriction applies at the level of quantifica- 
tion: in intuitionistic arithmetic, a statement of the form ( Ex 1 P( x 1 is provable only 
if some ground instance of the formula PC x 1 is also provable [13]. Thus, in view of 
the proposed constructive interpretation of definite clauses, even the general imita- 
tion of clausal form, namely that the existence of objects in conclusions must be 
expressed by naming them, loses this limitative character: what is classically seen as 
simply a Skolemized version appears as a “natural”, primary medium of expression 
if a constructive viewpoint is adopted. Constraining the syntax to definite clauses 
conveniently prevents affirming something, e.g. ( Ex )P( x 1, which could not be 
affirmed anyway without first affirming something else, in this case P( n 1; a similar 
reversal of perspective accompanies the “loss” of disjunction. 
The prohibition of disjunction and existential quantification in facts and conclu- 
sions need not extend to conditions of implicative clauses: the restriction to simple 
facts makes it possible to use them in this way without abandoning a constructive 
framework. Variables appearing in conditions only, such as ‘y’ in the clause 
(x,y) P(x) <- Q(x,y) 
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can be understood as locally existentially quantified: 
(x) P(x) <- (Ey) Q(x,y) 
This use of existential quantification seems constructively acceptable, because an 
application of the rule is bound to instantiate the variable on definite facts or their 
(definite) consequences. Analogous considerations apply to the use of disjunctive 
conditions: 
R <- (P v Q) & S 
Since this usage of disjunction is eliminable, it can readily be tolerated, if disjunction 
is defined (as a predicate!) by the clauses: 
P v Q <- P 
P v Q <- Q 
These clauses, which determine a constructively limited disjunction, simulate a 
transition to those clauses which would ensue if the disjunction were explicitly 
eliminated.2 
In Heyting’s axiomatization of intuitionistic logic, logical axioms are suitably 
restricted, while the rules of inference remain classical; in definite clause programs, it 
is extralogical axioms which are constructively restricted. The determination of a 
constructively restricted syntax of definite clauses can be interpreted in light of 
Quine’s remarks [ll] on the relationship between constructivism and intuitionistic 
logic? 
One can practice and even preach a very considerable degree of constructivism without 
adopting intuitionistic logic. Weyl’s constructive set theory is nearly as old as Brouwer’s 
intuitionism, and it uses orthodox logic; it goes constructivist only in its axioms of existence 
of sets. 
4. THE PROLOGIC OF HORN CLAUSES 
The constructive view of definite clauses can be extended to Horn clauses if denials 
are understood in the limited PROLOG way, as “ rhetoric” and instrumental: their 
function is to activate programs consisting of definite clauses by provoking the 
theorem prover to refute them by exhibiting counterexamples. The exclusion of 
denials from programs themselves would correspond to the fact that constructivism 
‘A real extension of the logical form of definite conditionals is brought about through the possibility 
of temporarily cutting off part of the axioms in order to block certain proof attempts. This can be used 
to implement a kind of negation formally within definite clause syntax, thus partly circumventing its 
defining restrictions. The clauses (for the predicate!) of this negarion as failure [l], 
not(P) <- P & cut & O=l 
not(P) <- 
could be related to the tautology 
P -> - - P 
and its contrapositive. The notions of provability and “absurdity” (0 = 1) also enter in the definition of 
intuitionistic negation, but in a different manner. 
‘The constructive view of definite clauses suggests that the predecessor of their procedural interpreta- 
tion, given by Kowalski (81, could be sought in the interpretation of intuitionistic logic as a calculus of 
problems (Aufgubenrechnung), given by Kolmogorov [7]. 
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defines truth as provability,4 which means that negative statements do not belong on 
the same level as (positive) facts, from which proofs proceed. As Heyting would say, 
constructive negation cannot be mere “de facto” falsity [6]. 
The connectives of negation and disjunction in the negative clause 
(cl) (x,y ,... 1 -Ql v . . . v -Qm 
indicate the way in which the resolutional machinery of the PROLOG theorem 
prover operates on the clauses of a program and goals of the form 
(c) (Ex,y ,... 1 Ql & . . . & Qm 
Thus, a constructive interpretation of logic programming by means of Horn clauses 
need not attempt to find a constructive interpretation of the negation and disjunc- 
tion in (c’); rather, (c’) should be understood as that negation of (c) which triggers 
the classical mechanism of reductio ad absurdurn. The language of PROLOG can 
thus be understood constructively as resulting from the exclusion of disjunction and 
negation from clausal logic, while its deductive machinery, which performs in- 
ferences over this restricted form, remains classical.5 
From a traditional ogical point of view [5], the proof procedure of the PROLOG 
interpreter is a special case of resolutional refutation. From the viewpoint of the 
proposed constructive interpretation, it is important that during the propagation of 
negations of existentially quantified statements through the implicative clauses and 
at their ultimate confrontation with the facts, instances of the variables are de- 
termined (correctly, if occur-checks are performed). The attempt at constructive 
interpretation at first appears somewhat unusual in that it is precisely the basic 
deductive mechanism of PROLOG, 
<program> & -(Ex) P(x) I- Cl 
____________________~~~~~~~~ 
<program> I- (Ex) P(x) 
which is the constructively objectionable case of reductio ad absurdurn (while the 
variant with interchanged “signs” of the existential predication is not) [lo]. But the 
PROLOG theorem prover performs such reductions over definite clauses, which 
ensures the constructivity of the procedure. 6 This constructivity will not be merely 
4The conception f negation which a logician of constructive persuasion would be lead to consider 
(and reject) first is negation as unprovability: Curry [2] says that ‘since an elementary statement of a 
deductive theory is true just when there is a demonstration of it one would most naturally say that 
such a statement is false just when no such demonstration exists.’ This conception of negation is partly 
implemented in PROLOG through negation as failure. 
51n view of the proposed constructive interpretation of Horn clauses, the fact of their theoretical 
sufficiency may remind one of the Kolmogorov-G&de1 proof of the relative consistency of classical with 
respect to intuitionistic arithmetic [13]: the fact that any problem which can be expressed in clausal form 
can be reexpressed by means of Horn clauses, as indicated by Kowalski in [8], is reminiscent of the fact 
that every sentence of classical arithmetic which is a theorem can also be proved intuitionistically. This 
similarity may be interesting to note, but is rather superficial: the Kolmogorov-G6del result depends on 
“homophonic” definitions (of classical connectives through intuitionistic ones) and does not involve 
passage to the metalanguage, whereas the result on Horn expressibility shows that the metalanguage can 
be structurally (but not lexically) weaker. 
6A constructive motivation can thus be found for Reiter’s question [12] concerning the logical form of 
data bases which yield no indefinite answers to positive queries; a sufficient condition is that the data base 
be Horn. 
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apparent; instances of variables will be “actually” constructed, expressed only in the 
terminology used in the text of the program. 
Standard PROLOG can be concisely described as definite clause logic in which 
one reasons analytically, always taking the clauses in their given order and first 
thinking through one condition of a rule before considering the next. This procedure 
is, however, not complete [9], which complicates the comparison between logical 
consequence and effective construction [3]. With incomplete systems for logic 
programming, such as the usual PROLOG theorem prover, this comparison remains 
idealized at a crucial point. 
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